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Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement (M5S) surged onto
the national political scene just before the 2013 parliamentary elections and succeeded in getting nearly 25
percent of the overall vote. Moreover, it was the only
political movement that was able to attract votes
across the different regions in Italy, making it the only
national party in the country (Diamanti, 2013). It elected 163 deputies―109 to the lower Chamber of Deputies and 54 to the Senate. Even Forza Italia with its
phenomenal rise in the 1994 elections did not produce
similar results. In that election, Silvio Berlusconi’s party
reached 21% and did better in the northeast and south
than in the center or northwest. In addition to the rapid
breakthrough of M5S, another noteworthy element in
that election was the level of voter volatility, one in ten

voters remained undecided until the election and more
than 40% of electors voted in a different way compared
to the 2008 general elections (Bordignon & Ceccarini,
2013a, p. 5). The nonparticipation level reached a record 26 percent (about 5 percentage points above previous elections). While the above descriptive facts are
interesting in themselves, they do not provide any explanation that accounts for the movement’s success in
the 2013 elections (Diamanti, 2013).
In this article, we explain the rise of the Five Star
Movement by providing a contextual analysis as to why
Italy, more so than other Western European democracies, has been beset by diverse forms of populism such
as the Northern League, Forza Italia and the Five Star
Movement (Woods, 2014). Our analysis is based on
primary and secondary data sources, a web-based survey of M5S adherents, and limited open-ended inter-
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1. Introduction

views with M5S supporters. The overarching thesis of
this article is that the rise and persistence of populism in
Western European democracies is an indication of a crisis of representation (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013; Santoro, 2012; Taggart, 2002,
2004). A crisis of representation can arise from different
factors―structural and/or conjunctural―, such as a
change in generational loyalties, a drop in partisan identification, or an exogenous shock to the political system.
In the case of Italy, the crisis was initially an internal one;
however, external factors have played their part.
The postwar party system that took root in the early
1950s and lasted until the early 1990s underwent a
gradual and then accelerated decline as its social, ideological, and institutional links to Italian citizens eroded
(Kriesi, 2014). The crisis of the Italian First Republic led
to what some deemed a transition to a so-called Second Republic. For many, the adoption of mixed electoral rules in the referendum in 1993 that moved Italy
away from the previous proportional representation
system and recast party competition into center-left
and center-right blocs served as the strongest indication that a transition had occurred. Bull (2012), Bull and
Rhodes (2009), and Newell (2009) argue, however, that
the focus on the purported transition from a First to
Second Republic has obfuscated the continuity and
persistent problems with political representation in Italy. As Bull and Rhodes (2009, p. 6) state:

2. The Analytics of Populism and the Crisis of
Representation

We situate the rise of Five Star Movement within the
broader context of the crisis of representation of the
First and the so-called Second Republic.
This paper is organized into six parts. We start by
framing the rise of Five Star Movement within an analytical and theoretical model that explains the rise of
populist movement along three dimensions: politicization of resentment, exploitation of social cleavages, and
the polarization of feelings of non-representation.
Then, we focus on the crisis of representation that has
characterized the Italian political system for quite some
time. Next we lay out the populist discourse employed
by M5S to politicize resentment. Followed by an analysis of the movement’s reframing of social cleavages in
Italy with a web-based ground up mobilization strategy.
Finally, we provide an empirical snapshot of who supports Grillo’s movement, concluding with a brief assessment of the contradictory aspects of the movement that could threaten its long-term durability.

As an analytical tool, populism has gotten somewhat of
a bad reputation as an amorphous concept with little
empirical traction. Ironically, much of this negative reputation comes from scholars who employ the concept.
The frequently uttered cri de coeur from them regarding populism is that it is a vague concept that lacks a
coherent definitional basis. As Ernesto Laclau (1977, p.
143) emphatically put it, “few [terms] have been defined with less precision. We know intuitively to what
we are referring when we call a movement or an ideology populist, but we have the greatest difficulty in
translating the intuition into concepts.” Nearly everyone employing the concept begins with this type of observation: that the concept lacks a clear theoretical
frame and that its use causes confusion due to the absence of a settled and shared definition. Then, most
studies of populism proceed with the assertion that despite its lack of settled and shared definitional basis and
methodology, there is a broad consensus in the literature that the concept has, at least, three core components that can be viewed as common denominators
that function as a relatively coherent conceptual
framework that suffices as the basis for empirical assessments of populism (Mudde, 2004).
Jagers and Walgrave (2007, p. 322) make a good
case that “populism always refers to the people and
justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with
the people; it is rooted in anti-elite feelings; and it considers the people as a monolithic group without internal differences except for some very specific categories
who are subject to an exclusion strategy”. These three
core elements anchor populism analytically and empirically. It is our view that Jagers and Walgrave are correct
and thus those in the extant literature who claim that
populism lacks a settled and shared definition are
wrong. Essentially, what many authors in the literature
on populism are doing is confusing the conflicting imperatives of the concept with its analytical utility.
All concepts have conflicting imperatives, defined as
“interdependent but contradictory goals, priorities, or
motivations that underline many social and political relationships” (Gould, 1999, p. 439). As an analytical tool
however, populism has a coherent definitional basis.
What it lacks is a neatly articulated theoretical identity.
In other words, populism is not a theory in terms of
having a system of consistent assumptions; however, it
is a robust concept that can be fitted into different theoretical frameworks. In this respect, the conflicting imperatives of populism have contributed to its ability to
capture within its conceptual net historical, cultural,
and context-specific forms of populism. The analytical
utility of populism has been particularly pertinent in
understanding the diverse developments of populism
in many Western European democracies. Pappas (2012)
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The equilibrium of Italy’s post-war system was
clearly “punctuated” by the political and economic
upheavals of the early and mid-1990s. But what followed has been less of a “transition” to something
new, and more of a post-crisis process of institutional (re-) stabilisation and negotiated change in
which the ‘new’ (or at least substantial parts of it)
looks remarkably similar to the “old”.

provides a theoretical model that encapsulates the
three core analytical elements of populism and helps in
explaining the rise and, in some cases, persistence of
populist social and political movements. He theorizes
that “populism obtains when a certain political entrepreneur is able to polarize politics by creating a cleavage based on the interaction between ‘the people’ versus some establishment, thus forging a mass political
movement” (Pappas, 2012, p. 8). He adds that populism is best analyzed “as a strategic power game aiming
to transform potential majorities into real ones by creating novel social cleavages”. Pappas (2012, pp. 8-9)
specifies three mechanisms that are sufficient conditions in understanding the causal link between crises of
representation and populism. The first is politicization
of resentment:

Starting in the 1980s, Western European democracies
have seen the emergence of populist movements and
parties along with the rise of anti-status quo discourse.
While populism has spread across Europe, the populist
phenomenon has gained traction in some countries
more than others. This is particularly the case in Italy

(Ignazi, 1996; Tarchi, 2008; Woods, 1992, 1995, 2010,
2014). With the collapse of the Christian Democratic
and Italian Communist parties’ hegemony in the early
1990s, the Italian party and political system underwent
a significant transformation (Mannheimer, 1991, 1993).
An insurgent regional populist movement, the Lombardy League, later known as the Northern League and
one of Italy’s riches businessman, Silvio Berlusconi,
emerged as pivotal populist players on the Italian political landscape in the context of the implosion of the
two main pillars of the postwar Italian political system.
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the ending of communism in Eastern Europe had a direct impact on the
Italian Communist Party, forcing it to transform itself into a more typical social democratic political and ideological formation. Then, in 1992, the anticorruption operation Mani Pulite (clean hands), sometimes referred
to as Tangentopoli, spearheaded by judges in Milan put
the Christian Democrats and the Italian Socialist Party
under enormous pressure (Lazar, 2013, p. 320). While
the immediate cause of the collapse of the postwar
party system was these exogenous shocks, the endogenous decline within the context of political representation of the two dominant pillars of the postwar system,
the Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist
Party, had become manifest by the late 1980s.
Shin and Agnew (2008, p. 68) provide data on the
secular decline that the major parties faced before the
external shock of the corruption scandals to the party
system. Their data illustrate that between 1976 and
1992 there had already been significant erosion in electoral support for the largest parties relative to the rise
in popular support for various “protest” parties such as
the League and the Greens and a revived PSI. In 1976
fully 73.1 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies went to DC and the PCI; but by 1987 this had fallen
to 60.9 percent. And in 1992 DC and the two main heirs
to the PCI (PDS and Refounded Communists) accounted
for only 51.4 percent of the vote for the Chamber. So, if
Tangentopoli was the defining moment for the final
demise of the old system, the two largest parties had
already begun losing their electoral centrality long before. The end of the cold war, the failure of DC to respond adequately to the demands of its historic constituency of small businesses in the Northeast, and the
relative breakdown of the Communist and Catholic political sub-cultures (particularly the Catholic one) all
seem to have played some role in this loss of centrality.
In the institutional breach, two different forms of
populism emerged. Berlusconi created, literally overnight, a political party to take advantage of the vacuum
left on the center-right with the collapse in 1993 of the
long dominant Christian Democratic Party (DC), and
Umberto Bossi’s insurgent regionalist movement took
advantage of the crisis of the institutional status quo to
propose a new form of political and social representation. More recently, the Five Star Movement has seized
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When resentment is high, established parties,
whether in government or in opposition, are more
likely to try containing it lest it upset existing political alignment patterns. This is not however true for
populist parties, which thrive precisely on politicizing resentment and the sense of victimhood that
accompanies it.
The second mechanism is the exploitation of social or
political cleavages. It is understood as a key step in the
way that populist leaders exploit latent or salient feelings of non-representation. Populist leaders and the
rhetoric they use are able to do this by identifying a political or social divide between “the people” and the
people’s enemies. Failure of “true” or “real” representation is presented as the fault of the status quo. This is
reflected in a common assertion that populism builds
upon, a “we versus them,” a Schmittian divide that
splits societies into two broad social categories, “the
people” and some “establishment”. The third mechanism is polarization of resentment and feelings of nonrepresentation. Pappas (2012, p. 9) concludes that this
mechanism is essential for populism to emerge in the
form of a party or mass movement since “it involves pitting the disenchanted and resentful people against the
privileged establishment in an antagonism of such a
great intensity that it may threaten to tear society apart.
When polarized, societies tend to cluster around opposing poles; as the majority of the people cleave to one
pole or the other, the middle ground of politics gets lost
and the median voter becomes a rare occurrence”.
3. Crisis of Representation: The Italian Case

on the crisis of representation afflicting the electoral
and party systems dominated by Berlusconi, the Northern League, and the De Democratic Party (PD) to call
for a radical overhaul of the political system. Grillo’s
populism is calling for a less elite and party-dominated
form of political representation. It relies heavily on social media and other nontraditional types of direct participation to bring about what it claims are more direct
and participatory forms of democratic representation.
Mair (2002) feared that the rise of populism indicated a systemic crisis of political representation across
Western Europe. He saw the decline of party systems
and increased voter volatility as manifestations of the
crisis. The decline of political parties entailed the loss of
an important intermediary institution between citizens
and the state. Kriesi (2014, p. 364) provides a summary
of Mair’s view on the function of parties in a democratic system:

The M5S was born in 2005 as local civic lists and was officially founded in 2009. At the outset, the movement

began as a blog by the Italian comedian, Beppe Grillo.
Immediately, the blog gathered a large following. Grillo
used his blog to comment on various political and social issues in Italy and globally. For example, the blog
became a focal point for those in Italy who opposed the
Iraq and Berlusconi’s support of President Bush. Somewhat like a “catch-all” phenomenon, Grillo’s blog had
something for everyone. The most salient theme that
he developed was his attack on the Italian political
class, referred to as the “caste” (Rizzo & Stella, 2007).
He highlighted the many privileges that elected officials
in Italy benefited from and accused them of collusion
and corruption. Using the internet as a focal point to
galvanize an angry public, Grillo called for a day of action―V-day―to clean up a corrupt parliament
(Casaleggio & Grillo, 2011).
Borrowing from the online activism tradition in the
United States, Grillo called for the creation throughout
Italy of local civic groups. As Mosca (2014, p. 41) points
out, “initially, the blog represented an important hub
for his fans all over the country. In July 2005, he suggested that his supporters create local groups using the
Meetup platform. As explicitly recognized by Casaleggio, this choice was inspired by the American group
MoveOn. Civic lists mushroomed. In some instances,
they were newly created local groups and in others
they were already existent groups that had been
formed around local issues that joined the network
(Lanzone, 2014). The objective of V-day of action was to
crystallize the latent resentment against what Grillo
identified as a corrupt political caste. The different civic
groups were tasked with mobilizing supporters to protest on 7 June 2007 in town centers throughout Italy.
The success of V-day led to a V-day two the following
year with Grillo collecting signatures for a referendum
to abrogate the Gasparri law on the media that he
claimed limited free speech. The civic lists entered the
electoral arena in 2007 under the banner of “friends of
Bepe Grillo”. Grillo invited these groups to aggregate
themselves into a common movement under the symbol
of the Five Star Movement. The five stars reflected the
“catch-all” element of Grillo’s blog and protests. The
stars represented one for clean energy, water, internet
connectivity, garbage collection and social services.
The Five Star Movement style of populism tied resentment over local environmental and social services
issues to a larger national theme of a nonrepresentative political caste (Bordignon & Ceccarini,
2012). Typical of a populist strategy of communication,
the M5S used resentment over different issues, in most
cases local or regional, to crystallize the theme of “us”
versus “them.” In this respect, the M5S emerged as a
constellation of local issues galvanized around a populist thematic of politics and political representation being about the real people. The movement’s political
slogans emphasize the sovereign people (Bordignon &
Ceccarini, 2013b). Grillo’s movement benefited from ty-
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Arguably, political parties are the most important
organizations linking voters and their representatives in established democracies. But parties have a
double function: they not only link civil society to
the polity, they also organize and give coherence to
the institutions of government. As Peter
Mair…observes, their unique contribution to the
development of modern democracy was that they
combined these two crucial roles (representation
and government) into one.
If parties lose their representative function, Mair argued that this “opened the door for populist protest”
(Kriesi, 2014, p. 361). Kriesi and Pappas (2015, p. 18)
identified contrasting responses to the loss of representative functions by parties in Europe:
The populist surge has been particularly strong in
Southern and Central-Eastern Europe. The two
types of surges show, however, different patterns:
while the more recent wave of CEE populism and
anti-establishment mobilization more generally is
partly (but certainly not exclusively) related to the
emergence of “purifier” parties promising better
and scandal-free governance, Southern European
populism is generally highly polarizing, often antisystemic, and thriving on the left as well as on the
right of the political spectrum.
All three of the mechanisms identified by Pappas
(2012) are evident in the rise of the Five Star Movement.
4. The Politicization of Resentment: The Rise of Civic
Populism

ing local issues to national themes. The success of this
strategy was demonstrated with M5S unexpected success in the 2012 municipal elections followed a few
months later with its triumph in regional elections in
Sicily. In regards to the 2012 elections in Sicily, Grillo
used the mix of online discussion and populist themes as
way to support local M5S candidates despite little media
coverage. He engaged in a variety of different publicity
stunts to draw attention to himself and local issues.
As Bobba and McDonnell (2012, p. 4) point out:
The successful mixture of online and offline, Grillo
and grassroots, was well in evidence during the October 2012 Sicilian regional election campaign. Having swam (the relatively short distance) across to
the island from Calabria, Grillo proceeded to pack
out piazzas across Sicily in support of local M5S

candidates chosen from the meet-ups. As a result,
the M5S candidate for the regional presidency Giovanni Cancelleri rose in just a few weeks from less
than 5 per cent in the polls to take over 18 per cent
(and third place) in the election.
The linking of local issues with a broader populist thematic is illustrated, for example, in the movement’s clever
campaign poster that said, “vote for you” (Figure 1).
Obviously, the objective was to mobilize the growing number of non-voters and those alienated from the
mainstream parties. For obvious reasons, the politics of
resentment focused on the “corrupt political caste”. In
his 2013 national election campaign that Grillo called the
“Tsunami Tour”, he invoked the metaphor of a wave
washing away the corrupt Italian party system (Figure 2).

Figure 1. “Vote for You.” 2012 Sicilian Regional Election Campaign. 1

Figure 2. Tsunami Tour. 2013 General Election Campaign.2
1
2

Posters are in the public domain and available on the movement’s website: http://www.beppegrillo.it/europee/diffondi/
http://www.beppegrillo.it/europee/diffondi/
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Essentially, M5S exploited the myriad of local and
regional conflicts and controversies throughout the
country and blamed their non-resolution on the political “caste” in power in Rome. A good illustration of how
M5S exploited local issues is how they inserted themselves into the long simmering controversy over constructing a tunnel for a high-speed train between Turin
and Lyon. It was a salient issue in Piedmont and had often resulted in acts of violence to prevent the project
going forward. Grillo framed the project as proof of the
collusion between the political “caste” in power and
the Mafia, stating that:
They open the tunnel to the mafias! The International Treaty about Tav [the Turin– Lyon line] compromises to advantage the mafia structures. According to this international agreement, the
contract work procedures about the Turin–Lyon’s
constructive projects will be overpowered to the
French legislation, where is missing a specific rules
against mafia organizations. (Five Star Movement’s
Senators, April 2014)3
Although the M5S movement vehemently rejects being
classified as a political party or engaged in politics in
any traditional fashion, much of its rapid success is due
to its “catch-all” populist strategy. This “catch-all strategy” has allowed M5S movement to redefine old cleavages and articulate new ones.
Typically, populists present a transversal political
ideology that transcends traditional dichotomies such
as left and right and workers/owners. Populist movements arise principally to recreate a lost authenticity of
the people. Grillo’s movement is no different. Five Star
Movement’s rhetoric on cleavage issues reflects a sort
of trans-ideological strategy and more specifically an
“anti-political” focus (Diamanti, 2013, p. XV), aimed at
appealing to electors from different political tendencies. The success of the Five Star Movement in the
2013 elections suggests that this strategy worked since
the party succeeded in attracting support across Italy
and the traditional left-right divide. Unlike the populism
of the Northern League and Forza Italia whose electoral
success and appeal was concentrated in certain regions
and appealed to center-right voters who had previously
supported the Christian Democrats, the Five Star
Movement largely overcame the normal left/right or
north/south divisions. Distrust in traditional cleavages
was demonstrated by Five Star Movement’s supporters
in a web-survey realized in 2013 in which they indicated
a strong interest in politics—67 percent declaring that
they were interested in political issues—but a rejection
3Full

text is available at this link:
http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/parlamento/2014/04/t
av-aprono-il-tunnel-alle-mafie.html
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of the traditional left-right divide.4
5. Redefining Cleavages through Populist Rhetoric
With a “catch-all” thematic, the Five Star Movement
has been able to put “old wine into new bottles” (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013b). Unlike the Northern
League that created ex nihilo a quasi ethno-regional
cleavage out of northern resentment over taxes and
state transfers to the poorer south or Berlusconi’s repackaging a traditional anti-communist theme, the Five
Star Movement simply aggregated local issues into a national grievance framework. In doing so, it has been able
to present itself as representative of the Italian people
irrespective of region, class, past ideological affiliation. In
this respect, it has emerged as the most successful transideological party on the Italian political scene. However,
the aggregation of disparate local and regional issues
threatens any attempt to fashion a more coherent ideological identity. This accounts for why Grillo and other
M5S leaders are constantly on the attack against the
“other”, i.e., corrupt and conniving politicians, austerity
imposing external forces, and unscrupulous capitalists.
All populist movements emphasize how an “other”
threatens some essential quality of the people: be it
cosmopolitan capitalism, finance elites, corrupt politicians or foreign forces. Grillo’s rhetoric is infused with
the populist thematic of the real people fighting against
an entrenched and corrupt elite. This recurrent antielitist refrain is employed to highlight the purported virtues of the people as the source of political legitimacy
(Meny & Surel, 2002). Also, the “us” versus “them” thematic of populist ideology and rhetoric is forever present. In fact, the entire civic structure of the Five Star
Movement is premised on the idea that it allows for a
form of direct democracy that traditional political parties
are against. As Bordignon and Ceccarini (2013b, p. 435)
put it:
The concept of political representation proposed by
the M5S should be understood, then, as representativeness. The leader underlines this whenever “his”
candidates run for elections: the resemblance between the public square and the MoVimento is explicitly presented as an alternative to the distance
between citizens and politics: “They are all people
like you. They are your mirror, democracy back to
4

The survey was carried out in 2013 by one of the coauthors
(between the 27 of February and the 19 of March), with the
CAWI method (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing), on a
sample of 628 people. The questionnaire consisted of 34 questions. The web survey was hosted by the online platform “Survey Monkey”, thanks to the collaboration of the Five Star
Movement’s local groups’ referents, which undertook to forward the link to the national members. Political interest was
measured on a 1–10 scale. The values cited in this paragraph
consider the 8–10 preferences.
59

front”….”They are your people, taken from here and
placed there….Surveyors, an engineer, a student, a
lawyer, a drug dealer to keep our morale up a bit
there are all sorts”…Politics, for Grillo, is a simple
matter: the lack of professionalism and the inexperience of political employees are regarded as values,
offering a guarantee that these people are extraneous to the circuits of power.
Distrust of elites is an old theme in Italian politics. Even
before the collapse of the traditional post-World War II
parties in the 1990s, Italians conveyed in opinion surveys a growing distrust of parties and their governing
class. Grillo reanimated this distrust in claiming that the
parties that had replaced First Republic parties were no
different. Little had really changed. He attacked parties
across the political spectrum. Grillo’s leitmotif is that
political parties are a kind of organized racket whose
only interest in elections is to gain access to the privileges and perks given to elected officials in Italy. His attacks are stoked by widespread indignation about the
political ruling class, now commonly referred as the
“caste” (Rizzo & Stella, 2007).
In various rallies and online discussion Grillo attacked
the Italian political class as a corrupt and self-serving
elite who had done little for real Italians. He argued that
the major interest of career politicians was to gain parliamentary immunity, generous retirement benefits and
expense accounts. Besides these rents, they cared little
about policy or representation. Grillo contrasted the
supposed spontaneous civic aspects of the Five Star
Movement with the corrupt party system. He asserted
that (cited in Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013b, p. 435):
The political parties are dead. Citizens need to detach themselves from the dead while they are still
in time”(PC19, 2009). “Politics is long since dead.
Only vultures remain, who divide up the body of Italy” (PC28, 2009). Other recurrent contrasts are between truth and deceit, but also between small and
big: “We are like David and Goliath. We only have
the web, the MeetUps, our enthusiasm and my
meetings. They have all the rest. We are the last,
the excluded, the derided. That’s why we will succeed” (PC28, 2009).
Another cleavage that the M5S seized upon is generational. Grillo and other Five Star Movement leaders
pointed out that Italy was run by “old men” with little
ability to connect with the Italian youth. All of the political parties were dominated by a “gerontocracy”.
“These politicians don’t know what they are talking
about. They talk about the future. They are seventy
years old and they talk about a future they will never
see. We need young blood” (cited in Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2014, p. 434). The movement’s use of social media was part of the generational divide that Grillo
Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 54-64

harped on. Facebook, tweeter and other online social
media were used not only to announce V-day events
but also to stake out positions on a range of issues from
the environment, European Union, youth unemployment, corruption issues, media monopolies, to immigration. The decentralized organizational style of the
Five Star Movement is presented as something more in
tune with a younger generation than the hierarchical
traditional party structure.
While the Five Star Movement has attracted a
younger base of support than the main political parties,
the evidence indicates that the movement key demographic are Italian men in their mid-forties with a relatively high degree of interest in political and social issues. Along with this interest in politics is a
corresponding disposition for social participation via Internet discussions; petitions initiatives, and signature
and/or referendum proposals. For example, about 60%
of respondents in a Demopolis survey of 1,206 have
participated in local or environmental demonstrations,
organized by M5S local groups. Overall, what emerges
from the interviews is a propensity for new and alternative forms of mobilization and participation that contrast sharply with the more traditional mode of representation of Italian parties.5 In her study of M5S
activists, De Rosa (2013, p. 129) confirms our profile,
Most of them were born in the South of Italy but
live in the North-East. The vast majority of them are
white-collar workers or self-employed professionals
(in private firms or commerce) with a smaller group
of university students…5SM activists would like to
help Italy move forward but are blocked by a political class who are incapable of modernising themselves or the country, preferring to insist with conservative strategies. When questioned, the 5SM
activists appear very radical as regards public administration, the media, the jobs market but much
less so when it comes to support for a women’s quota in parliament or the abolition of the legal value of
a university degree. They refute the idea of
leaderism and anti-politics as media simplification
and prefer to think of themselves as anti-bad politics.
However, even with its focus on youth and technology,
M5S is not really a youth movement. In keeping with
the populist ideology of not representing groups based
on ideology or class, Grillo makes a similar argument
about generational divides. In fact, a central pillar in
the Five Star Movement’s political program is the protection and enhancement of pension funds for retirees.
5

The survey was carried out by the Istituto Nazionale di Ricerche Demopolis from October 7–10, 2012 on a sample of 1,206
interviewees, representative of all Italian adult citizens, subdivided according to gender, age, and place of residence.
http://www.demopolis.it
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The movement’s blog has been used as a forum to criticize the media and others for not addressing the crisis
faced by Italian retirees. The Northern League is the only other political party that has highlighted the plight of
Italian pensioners.6
Although M5S defines itself as neither left nor right,
it is viewed as having more of a center-left orientation
on most socio-economic issues. In light of its “catch-all”
characteristics and the contrasting policy positions it
has taken a stance on, it is a difficult movement to pigeon hole. In fact, the base of support and mobilization
of the M5S has varied over time depending on the type
of topic and resentment it has sought to exploit. The
data clearly indicates that the initial supporters of M5S
were largely center-left. In 2010, “nearly half 48 percent of the M5S supporters positioned themselves as
center-left” (Lanzone & Scotto, 2014, p. 14). Two years
later that number had dropped to 32 percent with
those positioning themselves as center-right rising to 28
percent from 11. The difficulty with classifying the M5S
movement as center-left is illustrated with the rightest
positions that Grillo has taken on the issue of immigration (Lanzone & Tronconi, 2015).
Grillo, in particular, has staked out a position on
immigration that is ideologically anchored to the right.
For example, on the question of granting citizenship to
the children of immigrants and overturning the punitive laws regarding illegal immigrants in Italy, Grillo’s
positioning on these divisive issues places him closer to
the anti-immigrant Northern League. As Bordignon and
Ceccarini noted (2013b, p. 433), “Grillo has declared his
opposition to the granting of citizenship to the children
of immigrants born in Italy, according to the principle of
jus soli. Previously, he had strongly criticized the enlargement of the EU to include Romania, and the presence of Roma in Italy, evoking the sacredness of the
borders of the fatherland”. Grillo’s anti-immigrant
stance has provoked tension within the movement. Following the death of immigrants off the coast of Sicily in
2014 that led to some 5-Star movement elected senators calling for a reform of the Bossi-Fini law that criminalizes illegal immigrants (Woods, 2010). Grillo strongly
rejected the call by M5S senators and threated to expulse them from the movement. He stated that “this
amendment is an invitation to migrants from Africa and
the Middle East to head for Italy….How many immigrants can we accommodate if one Italian in eight does
not have money?” (O’leary, 2013).
Another cleavage issue that Grillo has exploited is
European integration. The European Union and integration had not been a salient issue in Italian politics. The
left and the right as well as the general public had been
overwhelmingly pro-European. The Northern League
was the first political actor to disrupt the pro-European
6

See Grillo’s blog posting “Bye, bye pensions”.
http://www.beppegrillo.it/en
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consensus. Although the party had initially been favorable to European integration and the creation of the euro, it changed its tune and became stridently antiEuropean. Until the emergence of the M5S movement,
the Northern League had a kind of populist monopoly on
anti-European rhetoric. Like with the immigration divide,
Grillo seized on European integration cleavage that had
been framed by a party on the right and redefined it in a
new fashion. He called for Italy to leave the Euro and reject the austerity dictates of the European commission.
During the spring 2014 campaign for European parliament, Grillo stated, "We are Italy's Plan B", he told
the BBC. "Brussels bureaucrats have distorted the
dream of European democracy. Today, we are not at
war with ISIS [Islamic State] or with Russia, we are at
war with the European Central Bank!" (Bettiza, 2014).
Much of Grillo anti-European appeal is tied to the economic crisis that Italy has confronted since 2009. Many
in Italy viewed the fall of Berlusconi government in
2011 and the installation of a technocratic government
led by Mario Monti as something that had been orchestrated by the European Union under the guidance of
Germany and France. Grillo seized upon the austerity
measures adopted by Monti’s government as evidence
that Italy had lost its freedom as a sovereign nation. In
an interview, Grillo castigated the European Union for
undermining the nation-state while proclaiming that he
was a supporter of Europe:
On the contrary, I’m a staunch supporter of Europe,
but I’d like to see the very concept of Europe revisited. When Monnet, along with many others, created Europe, he founded it on coal and steel―on
tangible things. He was no technocrat. He used the
post-war Marshall Plan manna. He knew that steel
and coal were in German hands and that France
would never manage these materials. He acted this
way to manage concrete material. Now Europe is
based on abstracts. Look at our finances. We have
not only transferred our monetary sovereignty, but
also our food supply. Do you realize that Italy has
the best food in the world? Milk production centers
are French. Supermarkets are French while ours are
closing down one after the other. The free movement of workers has become the free movement of
slaves. There are Georgians working on Romanian
building sites. In Georgia there are Ukrainians and
so on. It’s the production of new slaves. 7
A recurrent element that runs through Grillo’s antiEuropean rhetoric is the question of representation.
Like his criticism of the Italian “political caste”, Grillo
7

Interviewed by Guiseppe Santoliquido, see We want to make
honesty fashionable again
(http://blog.lesoir.be/lesoirinenglish/2013/05/18/beppe-grillowe-want-to-make-honesty-fashionable-again).
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argues that the European Union is dominated by technocrats and self-interested politicians who care little
about the “real people”.
6. The Organizational Form of the Five Star
Movement: Personalized Representation
Scholars generally view populist organizations as
movements rather than parties. This categorization has
developed because populism has historically been the
carrier of anti-elitist (and also anti-system) ideological
messages. Populist leaders often emerge initially from
social and political movements and strongly reject what
they claim is the non-representative nature of traditional political parties. In this respect, the Five Star
Movement is no different. The Five Star Movement
emerged as a protest movement and still views itself
something different than a typical political party. It is a
sort of non-traditional amorphous party that folds myriad of local and regional issues under the same tent.
Different from the “catch-all” parties of the past, the
Five Star Movement does not have a large militant
membership base. It relies on local “cleavage issue” entrepreneurs to mobilize supporters. Moreover, it is not a
centralized bureaucratic party but more an amalgamation of local affiliates that are subservient to its charismatic leader. Local groups’ activities―concentrated in
the major cities―are characterized especially by
square meetings and informative gazebos, but also by
territorial petitions. However, it is only in online political discussions that M5S adherents are more active
than supporters of other political movements in Italy. 8
Thus, the web and Grillo’s blog are clearly foci points
that supporters of the movement use to engage in discussions and debates on a wide range of issues. As an
indicator of its democratic credentials and authenticity,
web-based referenda and votes are used regularly by
the movement’s leaders. These referenda are framed
and dominated by Beppe Grillo to such an extent that
claims to real democratic participation are dubious
(Virgilio, Giannetti, Pedrazzani, & Pinto, 2015).
Grillo is not only the founder and leader of the
movement, but he is also its sole proprietor of its
brand. The Five Star Movement is registered as a
trademark on behalf of Beppe Grillo. Taggart (1995, p.
41) argues that such personalization of movements and
parties is a structural characteristic of populism. He
adds that “…the leadership is not a simple structural element. It is the mainstay of their messages and of their
8

Results from a web-based survey conducted between February 27 to March 13 2013 (method: Computer Assisted webinterviewing utilizing the diffusion technique known as survey
monkey) of 628 individuals. Surveyed individuals responded to
thirty-four structured questions that sought to assess their ideological orientation, level of civic participation, and online activism.
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party”. In other words, charisma constitutes the cement of the entire project and is also the main mobilization vehicle to keep their supporters (McDonnell,
2015). The populist leader is pivotal to exploiting and
polarizing popular resentment against the status quo
(Ruggiero, 2012). In this respect, Grillo’s personalized
style of civic populism and some of his actions/demonstrations are reminiscent of the rise of Umberto Bossi. Grillo has recognized the parallel himself:
If I am resembled to Bossi, I not aggrieve myself,
because Bossi was a street fighter with his undershirt. At that time, he screamed “Berlusconi you are
a Mafioso”. He said surprising things. Then, he became part of the system and the same system is
addled. And so he entered in the Banks, in the milk
quotas, in the dream of this Padania that it borders
to Duck-burg. Bossi lost the sense of his thoughts.
(Beppe Grillo, April 15, 2012) 9
In this message, Grillo emphasized again his opposition
to the current political system and its political “caste”,
whose self-interested actions results in a betraying of
the Italian people.
His personalization of M5S and his difficulty in allowing elected representatives of the movement much
autonomy does not bode well for its future. However,
its organizational flexibility and aggregation of disparate local and regional grievances appear to be sources
of resilience. In recent regional elections, M5S lost
votes but showed a remarkable presence in Italy’s
many small and medium sized towns in the seven regions in which the elections took place. Across the seven regions, it averaged about 17 percent of the vote.
7. Conclusion
The Five Star Movement is indicative of the kind of
populist surge that has swept across Europe. Grillo has
identified a broad range of local, regional and national
issues over which there is a great degree of resentment
and tethered them to the populist rhetoric of being a
non-traditional political party that emerged as a true
form of democratic representation. Like other populist
movements, M5S sees itself as providing the real people with a true form of political representation that has
been confiscated by elites. Bepe Grillo, as political entrepreneur, has stepped into the vacuum that Mair
(2002) feared would be the consequence of the decline
of traditional mediating role of European party system.
What sets Grillo’s populist style apart is the use
non-traditional media to mobilize supporters. In this
sense, Grillo’s movement is an example of a relatively
new type of “web-based populism” (Corbetta, 2013, p.
9

The full Grillo’s message is available at this link:
http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=pM9XTOR4MzU
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197). The use of the web has allowed M5S to combine
old and new strategies of communication and mobilization. The use of the web and the actup and meetups in
local centers in Italy lets the movement claim that it
has finally brought to Italy a more direct form of democracy. In keeping with the logic of populism, it has
done away with the traditional intermediaries of political parties and labor unions to allow the people to directly engage in politics via online discussion forums
and public engagements. In general, all these aspects
underline a heterogeneous base of M5S members and,
more generally, voters characterized by the common
resentment against political elites and traditional political parties (De Rosa, 2013).
The rise of the M5S is captured well by the three
mechanisms specified in Pappas’ model. Grillo’s M5S
movement seized on a pervasive resentment towards Italy’s political class, it repackaged old cleavages or animated new ones and it effectively used non-traditional
communication means to articulate an “us” versus
“them” picture of political representation. The Five Star
Movement was able to exploit to its advantage the
strong resentment among many Italians towards their
governing elite and to put together a heterogeneous
base of support; however, this diversity of resentments
makes it hard for the party to develop a coherent identity. After all, the old cleavages were able, for a long time,
to engender some degree of loyalty among supporters
who considered the party as the best vehicle for representation and participation in political life. It is not obvious that Grillo’s volatile personality and “catch-all”
strategy to aggregating local and regional grievances will
suffice in transforming a potential majority into a real one.
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